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(U) LEGAL NOTICE:  THIS PUBLICATION HAS BEEN PRODUCED BY THE DEFENCE SIGNALS DIRECTORATE (DSD), ALSO KNOWN 
AS THE AUSTRALIAN SIGNALS DIRECTORATE (ASD). ALL REFERENCES TO ASD SHOULD BE TAKEN TO BE REFERENCES TO DSD.  
The Cyber Security Picture 2013 
Summary 
1. This report summarises cyber intrusion activity identified by or reported to the Cyber Security 
Operations Centre (CSOC) during 2013. It provides a broad overview of cyber threats to Australian 
government networks, as observed by the CSOC. 
2. The Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions remain your best defence against the cyber 
threat. Implementing the Top 4 strategies as a package is at the core of this protection, as they 
mitigate at least 85% of cyber intrusions responded to by the CSOC. The Top 4 strategies prevent 
execution of malicious software, and minimise software vulnerabilities and the ability of a cyber 
adversary to propagate across a network. The remaining 31 strategies form an excellent basis from 
which to assess further network security initiatives based on a risk assessment. Your risk assessment 
processes should take into account the specific risks faced by your agency, the information you are 
protecting, and your current network security posture.  
3. While socially engineered emails remain the most prevalent threat to Australian government 
networks, the CSOC observed the emergence of several new techniques used in these emails during 
2013, such as the use of cloud storage providers, Java files, and the repurposing of genuine emails. The 
increasing skill and resourcefulness of cyber adversaries highlights the importance of being continually 
vigilant and up-to-date in your network security. The Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions 
have been updated in 2014 to reflect the evolution of the threat environment. 
4. Although the initial cost of implementing the Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions 
can seem high for some agencies, they actually represent an important investment in your 
organisation, reducing long term costs and risk. If you experience a network compromise, not only will 
you be faced with the cost of implementing these strategies to prevent further compromise, but you 
will also incur both higher direct and indirect costs associated with remediating the compromise. These 
costs include, but are not limited to: investigating the compromise, tactical remediation, reputational 
costs, opportunity costs from the loss of information, and lost productivity. See ASD’s The Cost of 
Compromise publication for more information about costs associated with compromise. 
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Something old, something new 
The same spear phishing threat… 
5. Targeted socially engineered emails remain the most prevalent method used to target Australian 
government networks. Where an intrusion method was identified, these emails comprised 53% of 
cyber security incidents responded to by the CSOC, in 2013. While the percentage decreased from 63% 
in 2012 and 77% in 2011, a corresponding increase in other techniques demonstrates the persistence 
and innovative methods of cyber adversaries to compromise Australian government information. 
…but new techniques 
6. While targeted socially engineered emails are a traditional threat vector, cyber adversaries have 
diversified aspects of their tradecraft in order to increase the likelihood of successful delivery and user 
interaction, such as through the use of:  
a. cloud storage providers, including Dropbox; 
b. Java (JAR) files; and 
c. repurposing genuine emails. 
7. Dropbox is a free online file storage service which allows users to share files and collaborate with 
other users, accessing and synchronising all types of files across all the devices they use. An email with 
a legitimate subject and a Dropbox link is more likely to bypass email content filtering and gateway 
antivirus scanning. Files shared through the use of Dropbox are downloaded over an encrypted 
channel, and consequently, unless an appropriate vendor product has been installed, the effectiveness 
of traditional network monitoring to detect malware significantly decreases.   
 
 
 
 
 
8. The CSOC recommends that you carefully risk-assess your use of cloud storage services, review 
the mitigations these services have in place and assess their effectiveness, and implement appropriate 
strategies to mitigate the risks. 
9. In 2013, the CSOC noted that socially engineered emails sent to Australian government 
departments containing malicious Java (.jar or JAR) attachments accounted for 10% of attachments 
used in socially engineered emails, where an intrusion method was identified. A JAR file is an archive 
file format that distributes software on the Java platform - successful execution of JAR attachments 
may allow a cyber adversary to gain remote access to the victim network. 
In a targeted intrusion attempt reported to the CSOC in May 2013, a socially engineered email was 
sent to several Australian government departments. The email contained a link to a Dropbox storing 
a zip file that concealed two executable (.exe) files. Upon opening the zip file, the user would then 
open what would appear to be a benign Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) file, while 
malicious code from the .exe file ran in the background. If the malware were to execute, it would 
attempt to communicate with a cyber adversary website to gain remote access to the victim 
network.  
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10. With its ability to run regardless of the user’s workstation architecture, the Java platform 
remains a preferred program to perform business functions. Although each new version of Java 
undergoes heavy scrutiny by the IT community for new security vulnerabilities, many Australian 
government agencies have poor patching practices, leaving them exposed to vulnerabilities that are 
exploited by cyber adversaries. 
11. The Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions have been updated in 2014 to reflect the 
growing emergence of Java as a threat to Australian government networks. In addition to 
implementing the Top 4 strategies to protect your network from your user’s browsing activities, the 
following strategies are also recommended to combat the Java threat: 
a. Strategy 5 – User application configuration hardening, disabling: running of Internet-based 
Java code, untrusted Microsoft Office macros, and unneeded/undesired web browser and 
PDF viewer features. 
b. Strategy 7 – Operating system generic exploit mitigation e.g. Data Execution Prevention 
(DEP), Address Space Layout Randomisation (ASLR) and Enhanced Mitigation Experience 
Toolkit (EMET). 
c. Strategy 17 – Email content filtering, allowing only whitelisted business related attachment 
types. Preferably analyse/convert/sanitise hyperlinks, PDF and Microsoft Office attachments. 
d. Strategy 18 – Web content filtering of incoming and outgoing traffic, whitelisting allowed 
types of web content and using behavioural analysis, cloud-based reputation ratings, 
heuristics and signatures. 
e. Strategy 21 – Workstation and server configuration management based on a hardened 
Standard Operating Environment, disabling unneeded/undesired functionality e.g. IPv6, 
autorun and LanMan. 
  
During 2013, the CSOC observed repeated attempts to compromise Australian government networks 
via Java attachments. In the typical scenario, a user inadvertently downloaded a JAR file after clicking 
on a malicious link. The file contained malware that would allow a cyber adversary to gain remote 
access to the user’s workstation, and then continue to propagate across the network from that 
point. Agencies that had successfully implemented the Top 4 strategies prevented serious intrusions 
from occurring. However, if the malware had been able to execute, it would have been possible for a 
cyber adversary to masquerade as the compromised user, send a socially engineered email enticing 
more users to click on the link, and then extensively compromise a network. 
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12. In addition to these strategies, ASD also recommends that you consider these additional 
technical controls for mitigating malicious Java exploits: 
a. Allowing Java applications to run only from trusted sources, such as the corporate intranet or 
Australian government (gov.au) internet domains. 
b. Configuring separate browsers for internal and external use. 
c. Investigate the use of Oracle’s Deployment Rule Set which ensures less trusted applications 
are run with only the latest version of Java, while allowing legacy applications to run on other 
versions. 
13. Cyber adversaries are persistent and aggressive in their efforts to compromise Australian 
government networks, and are constantly updating their tradecraft to achieve success. In 2013, the 
CSOC also saw evidence of legitimate emails and attachments being repurposed, modified to include 
malicious code, and then re-used to target Australian government users in socially engineered emails.  
 
 
 
 
 
Drive-by download and watering-hole techniques 
14. Open-source reporting has alluded to the growing popularity of watering-hole techniques in 
2013. Taking full advantage of a user’s trust in a website, the watering-hole technique provides an 
effective method for exploitation. 
 
 
 
 
15. In 2013, the amount of activity observed by the CSOC attributed to drive-by download activity 
increased. However, the nature of this activity was incidental and opportunistic rather than deliberate 
targeting – it is very difficult to identify watering-holes that have been specifically created to target 
particular users. Consequently, the CSOC has little evidence of premeditated targeting of Australian 
government victims using this technique. 
  
Intrusions using watering-hole techniques involve cyber adversaries compromising and placing 
malware on a legitimate website, in an attempt to compromise the computers of visitors to the 
website.  After learning their victim’s behaviour and habits, the cyber adversary chooses a website 
that their targeted victim has a valid business reason to visit, thereby creating a targeted drive-by 
download. 
The CSOC observed the increasing use of legitimate email addresses to conduct malicious 
activities. For example, a day after receiving a legitimate email, several Australian government 
employees received the same email but with a different attachment, containing malware. In most 
cases, these emails were ineffective as they were either blocked from reaching the end user, or the 
malware was blocked from executing due to the implementation of application whitelisting. ASD 
recommends that agencies also consider implementing Strategy 5 – User Application Configuration 
Hardening, to further protect their networks against this type of intrusion activity. 
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16. While user education is an important defence-in-depth approach, it will not prevent a user from 
visiting a legitimate website that has been temporarily compromised to deliver malicious content as 
part of a watering-hole or drive-by download. Visiting such a website might compromise the user’s 
workstation without any obvious indications of compromise to the user.  
17. There are two aspects to mitigating this type of activity: 
a. Ensure that your websites and web applications cannot be compromised and used as 
watering-holes. ASD has released the guidance document Protecting Web Applications and 
Users, which can assist. 
b. In addition to implementing the Top 4 Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions to 
protect your networks from your user’s browsing activities, you should also deploy: 
i. Strategy 5 – User application configuration hardening, disabling: running Internet-based 
Java code, untrusted Microsoft Office macros, and unneeded/undesired web browser and 
PDF viewer features. 
ii. Strategy 6 – Automated dynamic analysis of email and web content run in a sandbox to 
detect suspicious behaviour, including network traffic, new or modified files, or other 
configuration changes. 
iii. Strategy 7 – Operating system generic exploit mitigation e.g. Data Execution Prevention 
(DEP), Address Space Layout Randomisation (ASLR) and Enhanced Mitigation Experience 
Toolkit (EMET). 
iv. Strategy 17 – Email content filtering, allowing only whitelisted business related 
attachment types. Preferably analyse/convert/sanitise hyperlinks, PDF, and Microsoft 
Office attachments. 
A final word 
18. Your network is not necessarily the only network that holds your agency’s information – do not 
forget about contractors and other service providers, who may be the weaker and therefore more 
attractive target for a cyber adversary that wants your information. Also consider that you likely hold 
the information of others, often with contractual provisions around confidentiality or secrecy. While 
your own information may potentially not be of interest to a cyber adversary, information you hold for 
third parties may be, and cyber adversaries often target the weakest link. 
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Further Information 
19. The Australian Government Information Security Manual (ISM) assists in the protection of official 
government information that is processed, stored or communicated by Australian government 
systems, and is available at:  
http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/ism/index.htm 
20. ASD’s Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions and its companion ASD products, which 
complement the advice in the ISM, are available on ASD’s website: 
http://www.asd.gov.au/top35mitigationstrategies.htm 
Contact Details 
Australian government customers with questions regarding this advice should contact ASD Advice and 
Assistance at asd.assist@defence.gov.au or by calling 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371). 
Australian businesses or other private sector organisations seeking further information should contact 
CERT Australia at info@cert.gov.au or by calling 1300 172 499. 
 
 
